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"Smooth the dying pillow," as I understand it, was the rationale for Australian 
Aboriginal policy which was intended to ease the passage of aboriginal peoples into 
history as separate, indigenous peoples. 
In the United States the phrase has never been employed to epitomize Indian 
policy, although it could have been. Critical moments in Indian policy since the last 
of the Indian wars and last use of disease and alcohol as instruments of extermination 
have featured benign efforts to help Indians while at the same time easing the 
passage of indigenous groups. Every example of policy which was deadly in its 
impact on groups had supporters who viewed its effects as beneficial to the real needs 
ofindigenous individuals and to the hope and future oflater generations. 
Assimilation of indigenous youth through education which explicitly or 
implicitly stripped away tribal loyalty as it prepared youth for modern life is one 
example. Assimilation by breaking up the tribal or communal land base by 
individual allotment had as its overt aim the passage of tribal members into the 
mainstream of private property ownership. Even citizenship for American Indians 
was double-edged to the extent that it required a shift in loyalties from the tribe to 
the state as a condition of its achievement (Cohen, 1982:639). 
Each of these - education, land ownership and the civil rights of citizenship -
are not in and of themselves, evils to be avoided. In fact, they have been the political 
objective of many indigenous groups who seek survival within nation states. Yet the 
conditions for these and other policies may be a paring away of group identity as 
group political identity for the good of the persons involved. The pillow being 
smoothed is, then, that of the tribe. The tribe has been perceived as a lingering 
fixture of yesteryear whose continuing worth was questionable or even 
counterproductive to the real needs oflndians within the nation state. 
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Group political loyalty might be said to block communication or to retard it 
(Harrison, 1972). Tribal allegiance might retard necessary social or economic 
development. It might misprepare individuals for the new competitive realities each 
would have to conquer and endure. Finally, it might simply be incapable of taking on 
the responsibilities of a changing world or program designed to help individuals 
address a changing wor Id. 
Tribes have several interlocking meanings within the American legal and 
political process. Historically, they are separate political units, constituting what 
Charles Wilkinson (1982) terms a third order of government within the American 
federal system. This is often a hard proposition to digest since it means that a lowly 
village of eighty persons whose only income may be bingo and whose only permanent 
employee is a village policeman is possessed of more innate sovereign authority than 
the city of New York. Yet from this proposition flows a judicial rationale which 
allows Congress to allocate special rights or impose special disabilities upon 
American citizens who happen to be members of tribes and to add or subtract from 
tribal authority. This proposition is also one that rankles critics-from those who 
view this federal right to discriminate as a basic denial of equal justice under law to 
others who view the plenary power of Congress to give and take as an extension of 
colonialism into the present. Whoever is correct, these propositions have guided a 
third-tribes have actual or potential legal sovereignty as well as some direct 
ownership over natural resources, usually resources ceded to them in exchange for 
loss of aboriginal title to even greater resources. 
A tribe's capacity to govern and control these resources is bounded and 
compromised by its political relationship to the federal government and by the 
pressures and greed of the states denied these resources. 
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Some may view the tensions built into this American process which pits tribes 
against vigilant adversaries (and even other tribes) as little more than a facade for 
the unceasing struggles between the federal government and states over public lands 
and resources. From this perspective, tribes are no more than pawns which provide a 
convenient rationale for federal control in realms which would otherwise belong to 
the states. Whether this is true or not, in the twentieth century American Indian 
policies have been premised on the notion that they will raise up indigenous persons. 
Since the Great Depression of the 1930s they have been premised on economic 
improvement (Getches, Rosenfelt and Wilkinson, 1979:80-84). 
American Indian policies (with the single exception of termination in the late 
1950s and early 1960s) have given lip service to the principle of tribal integrity 
because this is one leg of the three-legged stool (Wilkin and Briggs, 1977:151-154). 
That is to say, even if recognized tribal governments were poorly managed, poorly 
funded and even corrupt, they provided the impulse for the federal government to 
designate special progams for Indians unavailable to other cultural or racial 
minorities and, further, to offer a cocoon of immunity for tribal governance and 
ownership ofland and resources. 
The net result for American Indians and their tribes may not be especially 
enviable. In economic terms, American Indians remain the poorest of the poor (Cahn 
ed. 1969:viii). Yet within the American system there are geographically determined 
places where indigenous communities deal with their lives with acknowledged 
political power, separate and undelegated. 
Can the meanings of tribe in the American political context be sliced apart and 
dealt with discretely without unraveling this rather simple primary relationship 
between a tribal group and tribal persons? Can tribal integrity over its own citizens 
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and its own resources, however ineffective, be removed as an operative premise in 
order to benefit more dirctly indigenous peoples? 
The policy generated for Alaska Natives - Indians, Yupik and Inupiat Eskimo 
and Aleut peoples, their villages and their hunting and fishing lifestyles - sought to 
replace the old three-legged stool with a superior body oflegislation which confirmed 
land rights and the federal preference without direct political involvement of Alaska 
Native villages. While a land base was ceded to Alaska Natives equal to the entire 
reserved tribal land base of other American Indians, the problematic model of 
management by tribal governments was avoided through its replacement with 
corporations based in villages and in the regions. Alaska Natives were shareholders 
to the corporations, not citizens, with an ultimate promised right to transform their 
birthrights into cash if they desired (U.S. Congress 1971, Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act; see Arnold, 1976). 
Tribal ownership or governmental control of the land was not included in the 
Act. Tribes (assuming they existed legally in Alaska) were in fact bypassed by the 
Act and were not even party to its negotiations. This aspect of the Act, the emphasis 
upon privatization with de-emphasis on tribal participation and federal trusteeship 
was only part of the experiment to bypass tribes as direct parties or participants. 
Tribal government was also ignored as a fundamental unit of service delivery. 
Moving from the premise that Alaska Natives were now cast as enrollees in a 
settlement act and that they had opted to cast that settlement in regional as well as 
in village corporate terms, program funds were directed to nonprofit regional 
corporations to meet requirements of villages scattered across the vast Alaska 
landscape (McBeath, 1982:125). 
The premise that Alaska Natives were entitled to unequal preference among 
Alaska citizens was not ignored. Congress used it to return the Act and amend it, to 
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deal with wide-ranging subsistence practices not readily contained on a settlement 
land base and to continue other forms of subsidies to meet the needs of Alaska 
Natives. 
In the end, the Alaska experiment was a thorough and vigorously pursued 
experiment in Indian policy which ignored the third order of government. I t  offers as 
does no other American example a look at the American relationshp with indigenous 
peoples without the pretense of tribal consent or their involvement as anything more 
than minor players among vocal interacting political interest groups who 
represented Alaska Natives. Members of Alaska village tribes were transformed into 
clients and petitioners to neotribal (corporate), state, federal and even international 
organizations. 
The Alaska experiment would not have occurred had not several generations of 
Alaska Native leaders been persuaded that "Alaska was different." The failed model 
of federal stewardship for the territory of Alaska could be improved upon through the 
emergence of vigorous and self-sufficient Native societies within the Alaska society, 
given Native access to jobs and natural resources. The political destiny of Alaska 
Natives, i t  appeared, was linked to the political destiny of the state. Overlooked in 
this equation was the prospect that Alaska, the sovereign state, would not tolerate 
competing sovereign claims to its vast natural resources and would view legal 
assertions of tribal authority as, more than this, indirect attempts to challenge its 
own destiny by the federal government using as its stalking horse, the charade of 
tribal sovereignty. 
The original agenda of Alaska Natives is important because displacement of the 
three-legged stool for sound economic reasons or for practical political reasons is the 
agenda for reform in other nations of the world. No one suggests that  i t  was 
dedicated to smoothing the dying pillow because it was addressed to the felt and 
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documented social and economic needs of Alaska Natives. Yet by 1988, the Alaska 
example suggests that, in fact, there is no substitute for building ambitious programs 
on small tribal governance. In the end it is in remote villages that Alaska Natives 
are self-defined and the premises which govern their legal protections are rooted. 
The Pre-Land Claims Agenda: 1955 -1965 
Alaska Natives and the cadre ofleaders who emerged during the late territorial
and early days of statehood had every reason to believe that self-determination of 
their societies and of the rest of the state were bound together. The political issues of 
both were connected to a failed pattern of federal control of Alaska's resources and 
their exploitation. 
The state labor pool was small. Labor leaders sought protection from imported
and seasonal labor by actively recruiting village people into their ranks in order to
enlarge the ranks of available Alaska hire when defense projects emerged in the Cold 
War era as a new source of employment. Alaska Natives recognized that the key to
village survival lay in a mixed economic pattern of wage labor and subsistence (Rock, 
1963:2).l Howard Rock, a Point Lay Inuit, who began publication of a statewide 
Native newspaper, argued that unless Native men and women could leave their 
villages periodically and undertake wage labor at union scale, villages would be left 
"dying on the vine" (Rock, 1964:1). To accomplish this, a new pattern of education 
was required, one that did not prepare Native youth to leave the village, but rather 
encouraged appropriate vocational training (Rock, 1962:1). Alaska Natives had
already experienced the unsatisfactory results of federal programs which removed 
their children for schooling inappropriate to either village life or to the then-
emerging job market. Yet all outside training was not deemed inappropriate. The 
Tundra Times reported approv ing ly when a g e n e r a t i o n of men 
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who would later emerge as claims advocates and managers was sent to California for 
technical training appropriate to jobs on military defense sites (Tundra Times, 1963; 
Snapp, 1988). 
Rock and others saw in the neglect of basic village needs, a further federal effort 
to encourage villagers to leave: 
We can surmise, perhaps rightly, that while village populations are 
being encouraged to move out, little or no attempts to assist them to 
improve such things as health facilities and water systems are being
made. As a result of this neglect some Native children have gotten sick 
and have had to be sent to hospitals (Rock, 1964:1). 
In fact, the northern village of Barrow had tested and found beneficial this new 
plan. There, Natives had been given preference in construction for the Navy. Along 
with jobs at union scale had come new housing and other benefits (Sonnenfeld, 1956). 
This realistic focus on employment and education appropriate to known and 
anticipated employment was also the platform of those Alaska Natives who 
represented rural communities in the territorial and early state legislatures. The 
founders of the state had grafted into the state constitution a representational 
formula which gave rural populations representation disproportionate to the 
population of the Alaska bush. William Beltz, Frank Degan, Frank Peratrovich, 
Eben Hopson and others were skilled legislators who worked as an Ice Bloc to further 
Native interests, even in those days of relative state poverty. The Ice Bloc supported 
construction of rural vocational schools and supported locally controlled unions 
against urban lawmakers and national unions bent on continued use of imported 
labor (Hopson, 1965; Bradner, 1965:1). 
Even when the bush lost direct representation through court-mandated 
reapportionment, Native expectation that it would become a force within state 
politics remained high (Tunda Times, 1965). The Arctic Slope Native Association 
was created to organize rural Inupiat and join forces with already strong blocs in 
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Southeastern Alaska, including the Alaska Native Brotherhood. Finally, the urban-
based Alaska Federation of Natives emerged in 1967 (Arnold, 1976). 
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The Land Claims Era: 1967 - 1972 
The opportunity for a settlement to long-unresolved claims based on aboriginal 
rights shifted the focus of the Native political agenda and created additional leaders 
and organizations to deal with a land base larger than one represented by land in the 
immediate vicinity of villages. Mini-land grant settlements or ones which were 
village-based only, supported by the state, were viewed as inappropriate to the legal 
claim mounted and insufficient to meet the economic needs of Natives (Berry, 1975). 
Yet other factors influenced a changing perception of village interests and 
needs. Beginning in the late sixties, Congressional task forces and entities such as 
the Federal Field Committee (1968) began to document the poverty of rural Alaska, 
its marginal housing, its health concerns and its educational needs. 
Architects of War on Poverty programs laid in place organizational 
arrangements which were followed in the future. Programs were designed and 
delivered from urban and regional centers. Villagers were perceived as poor clients 
who received trickle-down programs, aid andjob opportunities. 
Land claims leaders were a new crop of college educated politicians who saw 
high school education for Native youth as preparation for college. College training 
would prepare them for jobs in the corporations spawned by land claims at the village 
and regional levels. These leaders were also skilled in state legislative 
representation. They pressed upon the state legislature the funding and construction 
of village high schools which returned to the villages young people on a year-round 
basis (Morehouse, McBeath and Leask, 1984:197). 
All villages benefited from a variety of improvements in infrastructure and
services. Only the North Slope Inuit followed the original plan of Native leadership
to its logical conclusion, however. Under the direction of Eben Hopson, a leader from 
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the earlier generation, it created the first rural borough as a vehicle to capture oil 
wealth through direct taxation and as a mechanism to borrow millions to underwrite 
a capital improvement program (Morehouse and Leask, 1980:625). The capital 
improvement program created a vast public works program which not only built 
schools, police stations and fire houses (as well as housing), but guided contracts for 
work to firms prepared to hire borough residents. This combined political and 
economic initiative drew continual legal fire from the state and the oil companies. It 
challenged the pattern of improvements in other regions where state and federal 
officialdom designed and extended programs and services through Native non-profit 
corporations and through increased regional bureacracy (McBeath, 1984:113-130). 
Yet even with differences in degree of political control and wealth controlled 
and guided by Native people, similarities emerged from a village perspective. In all 
areas village parents had more ready access and responsibility for their children. In 
all areas villages gave over power to governments located in their regional centers. 
Even in the North Slope Borough, Alaska Natives secured positions in labor and 
clerical positions while middle management positions went to outsiders (Institute of 
Social and Economic Research, 1981). The borough hired outsiders to fill government 
service positions in its schools, police, health and other departments just as the state 
filled out its rural units with employees hired in the urban centers. The net result 
was cyclical employment for Native labor, increased opportunities for Native women 
in secretarial positions at the regional center and a vast increase in the numbers of 
non-Natives who lived and voted in Alaska's bush (Conn, 1987:86). 
Village schools were not controlled by villagers, but dominated by regional 
school boards and teacher unions. College preparatory courses did send increased 
numbers ofN atives to the University, but drop-out rates were high (Kleinfeld, Travis 
and Hubbard, 1982:9, 19 ). 
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Bright Native graduates of the University of Alaska cut short their plans for 
higher education in order to work in Native corporations at high salaries, bowing to 
the need to support their families. This tendency to reach for the job within reach and 
to postpone or forego commitment to a career made very good sense to Native 
Alaskans, educated to the boom and bust economy of their regions and the state. 
However, these economic choices by the ubest and brightest" allowed public 
employment in the state to become a bastion of entrenched and unionized employees. 
Only three percent were Alaska Natives (ISER, 1986). 
Villages (and oil wealth) were the reasons for government growth in the cities 
and regional centers, but villages were not participants except in the most marginal 
sense. They lost de facto control over local matters, pushed out of the markets by 
increasingly interventionist government programs. Government jobs left for village 
people were the leavings- health aides, state magistrates, school janitors and teacher 
aides, jobs distributed as scarce commodities among families in need of steady wages 
(Conn, 1985). 
In the meantime, the claims settlement created its own agenda of work for 
Native leadership. The process of claims implementation was slow and seemingly 
resisted at every turn by federal agencies who were being displaced. It generated 
legal conflicts between corporations as well. Village expertise was burdened with 
land selection, accounting, and a range of corporate decisions that very often left 
them prey to expensive legal advisors, management consultants and other experts 
(Gondolf, 1988:153). Bright villagers who had in the past served as communications 
brokers and mediators between state and federal agencies and traditional village 
leadership were diverted to these frustrating but paying tasks. 
It is not surprising that debates over state or village authority which might 
have occurred did not. Native leaders traveled back and forth to Washington to 
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amend and reamend legislation related to the settlement act or to press for the 
transfer of federal and state programs to non-profit regional administrations. Thus, 
the drift away from the premise of guiding governmental authority at the village 
level, while perhaps conscious on the part of the state, occurred nearly by default. 
Villagers as well as Native organizations fell into the trap of defining the issue of 
village life in terms of the quality and level of service and not in terms of control over 
that service (Angell, 1979). 
Native leadership had seen the state ncave in" to a Congressional compromise 
which not only generated a claims settlement, but that also laid the basis for oil 
development and state public land selection. Yet this political compromise deviated 
not at all from state leadership's commitment to press Congress for extinguishment 
of Indian claims through compensation so as to remove any cloud over Alaska's 
resource development (Fitzgerald, 1959). From the earliest days, i t  was clear that 
sharing of political power between the state and the villages as Indian tribes who 
might engage in competing management of natural resources in consort with the 
already pervasive Interior Department was to be avoided (Naske, 1985:143). Even 
the extension of state high schools to the bush could be interpreted as an exercise in 
removal of federal intrusion into an area of governance traditionally associated with 
state government. The claims settlement used Native villages as a benchmark of 
entitlement, but did not create competitive sovereignties. Much in the vein of the 
historical hostility to proposed demarcation of village reservations in the 1930s and 
1940s (Sonnenfeld, 1956), i t  provided that the core of village land would either be 
turned over to a state municipality or to a state trustee (Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act, 1971 § 14C(3)). Individual lots were to be provided village residents, 
Native and non-Native (Arnold, 1976:250). 
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Whether by intent or design, Alaska's representatives and Native leadership 
created the most thorny question of federal Indian law for a later generation of tribal 
sovereignty advocates: even ifit is established that functioning tribal units persist in
Alaska, over what land base do they govern members and land use activities, given 
the Congressional mandate to define land rights as ultimately subject to state law? 
1988-A Watershed 
By 1988, Alaska the state had stumbled into its third acknowledged year of 
economic depression. The price of oil had collapsed and, with it, state revenues. 
Although the state had created a permanent fund of oil wealth, i t chose to put the 
brakes on state spending. The resulting domino effect caused a ten percent drop in
population, massive business failure and a collapse in the housing market.
Some sectors of Alaska society remained protected. State public employees 
were sustained at their former rates of high pay. But other sectors of Alaska society 
suffered. 
When Community and Regional Affairs staff conducted interviews in 172 
communities they found that ninety-five per cent had to significantly reduce one 
essential service. Police services had been reduced in more than half. Twenty-four 
per cent had cut funding for health clinics and twenty per cent in fire protection. 
Thirty-five per cent of unincorporated places, traditional villages, had reduced 
health clinic services. More than twenty-five per cent said they would soon be unable 
to continue providing fire, health clinic and sewer services (Anonymous, 1988). 
Village Alaska underwent a penetrating analysis in Alaska's largest  
newspaper. The eight-part series created a new portrait of rural Natives for urban
- 13 -
readers who rarely visit the Alaska bush. No longer were Alaska Natives portrayed 
as subsistence hunters engaged in corporate capitalism. Now they were described as 
"People in Peril" (Anchorage Daily News, 1988). The eighty-page series captured the 
attention of Alaska at precisely the time that Congress amended anew the claims 
settlement act in ways that seemed to make less likely the sale of Native stock or the 
loss of Native land (see below). It portrayed villages as floating in a "river of booze." 
Villagers were killing themselves with drugs and alcohol; villages were experiencing 
epidemics of suicide, murder and alcohol abuse. 
Armed with statistics of Native suicide, especially high among Native males 
between twenty and twenty-four, the newspaper's editor wrote: 
We began asking simple questions: Why are Natives-especially young 
Natives-damaged so profoundly by every measure of despair? Why do 
they go to jail more than other Alaskans? Everwhere we looked, we 
found booze. Crime and booze. Suicide and booze. Accidents and booze 
(Weaver, 1988:A12). 
The series ran lengthy mock obituaries of village crime, alcohol, and drug 
victims. It detailed the bootlegging system established from cities and regional 
centers to villages and concluded that villages were out of control. The culprit was 
alcohol, but more than this, the culprit was disintegration of Alaska Native family 
life. 
The adult generation had ttbecome a generation adrift" (Weaver, 1988:A3). 
The government took their parents, sending many to Indian School,
thousands of miles away. These returned with elevated aspirations, 
diminished prospects for advancement, and little experience in 
successful family living. They turned away from elders and toward 
alcohol (Id.) 
As to today's 1 -year-old, "probably he lives in an isolated village of 
about 300. His parents were torn from home at 13; their parenting
skills were never well-developed. His village elders, the centerpiece of 
most Native cultures, were themselves overwhelmed by white assault: 
traders, missionaries, fuel oil salesmen. They now struggle with 
representatives of cultural change their ancestors never faced: 
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television repairmen and bill collectors and a village bootlegger 
resupplied by air" (Id.). 
Village life was portrayed as offering youth few options. They could drop out of 
school, leave the village or kill themselves. Villages were communities in the throes 
of self-destruction. The report cited the same state survey described above telling 
readers that eighteen Western Alaska villages were "in critical condition, unable 
even to heat public buidings or pay the salaries of police and maintenance workers. 
State officials said at least 20 more would be in a similar condition within months, 
victims of the oil bust of 1986" (Spenser, 1988:F-4). 
While the Tundra Times had reported the cutback in village services as a 
prelude to a report on efforts to seek special state emergency grants, the Anchorage 
Daily News employed it as additional fuel to its argument that for Alaska Natives, 
''leaving Alaska villages battered by poverty, alcohol abuse, despair and suicide, 
Anchorage is the shining city by the shore, a haven of steady wages and bright lights, 
a place to buy bread and meat at a shadow of their cost in the Bush" (Id.). 
The series castigated leaders of the Native movement who "have been in the 
forefront of corporate and legislative battles, but conspicuously absent from the fight 
against alcohol-fueled death and destruction" (Tetpon and White, 1988:H-5). 
The reaction to the series was, with few public exceptions, positive from urban 
Native organizations, bush legislators and even the Tundra Times. Few seemed to 
appreciate that this first in-depth series on village Alaska might have confirmed 
already developed legal and political positions guided by the heartfelt belief that 
villages had outlived their usefulness. 
The proposition that Native land and stock could be protected without further 
federal support or confirmation of tribal sovereignty was apparently validated anew 
the same month the series appeared by the passage into law of new amendments to 
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the Claims Settlement Act (United States Congress, 1987:11,925-33). They removed 
fear of automatic transformation of the stock into saleable shares in 1991. Now 
shareholders of regional and village corporations would have to vote to approve such 
sales. Special protections were offered against minority interests who might want to 
be compensated. New shares of stock could be issued for Natives born after the date 
of the settlement. Land granted under the Act was not placed into federal trust, but 
automatically "banked" to protect it from taxation or judicial taking so long as it was 
not subdivided or developed. 
These amendments had been approved by the annual convention of the Alaska 
Federation of Natives, newly reconstituted to include votes by "village entities," be 
they governments or corporations, along with regional profit and non-profit 
corporations. Left out of the compromise amendments was earlier language which 
would have empowered direct transfer of settlement land to Qualified Transferee 
Entities. Instead, language which proclaimed that the amendments were neutral as 
to village tribes and their authority was written into the legislation (Morehouse, 
1988). 
The ANCSA amendments continued the earlier pattern of land and stock 
protection without tribal involvement. Yet, by 1988 a substantal body of Native 
opinion was convinced that tribal authority was critical to village survival. The 
Association of Village Council Presidents and Tanana Chiefs, together representing 
more than ninety of two hundred villages, withdrew from the Alaska Federation of 
Natives after a vote to confirm the compromise amendments (Morehouse, 1988:16). 
On the legal front, the state continued to mount challenges at  every turn 
against the proposition that Native villages were tribal governments with sovereign 
authority over a land base. Alaska, said the state, was not Indian Country. 
Therefore, its power was exclusive and villages lacked authority to regulate civil 
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matters, including regulation of land use (Conn, 1987:78). Even in matters of 
adoption and custody of Native children, where Congress had specifically named 
Alaska villages as tribes for purposes of the Act, it argued that villages could not 
exercise tribal authority without explicit agreement by the Secretary of the Interior 
(Alaska Federal District Court, 1988). The state supreme court held in a May court 
decision that villages, with few historical exceptions, were not tribes (with sovereign 
immunity against suit) because Congress had not designated them as such (Supreme 
Court of Alaska, 1988). 
This vigorous legal offensive by Alaska included attacks on collaborative 
arrangements between villages and federal agencies to allow subsistence and wildlife 
management to coexist (Conn and Langdon, 1986). 
For Alaska in economic depression, seemingly incapable of sustaining services 
to rural villages, the legal strategy of the state might seem strange or even 
counterproductive. Surely the state would seek village initiatives in matters of child 
care or, more than this, tribal initiatives which can draw into play federal funds due 
and owing Indian tribes. Yet not even a one-third reduction in federal monies 
directed to Alaska Natives as American Indians nor proposed regulations which 
would narrow eligibility for federal health care as American Indians have changed 
the state position that any unchallenged manifestation of tribal authority as 
governmental authority might be used as proof positive of functioning village tribes 
within its domain. The chief architect of the state's legal offensive views the position 
taken by Alaska as vigorous opposition to discrimination by Native tribes, very much 
in line with earlier initiatives to end discrimination against Alaska Natives as 
citizens of the state (Conn, 1987:85). 
With so much concern expressed for Alaska Natives, with their rights so 
carefully protected, how can it be said that they are endangered merely because 
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indifference and even hostility to the notion of tribe abounds in Congressional 
legislation and in state legal strategy mounted in the name of equal justice under 
law? 
The answer may begin with the argument offered by the "People in Peril" series 
that village life has become nearly intolerable (and often deadly) for village people 
because Natives have lost their ability to raise and give their younger generations a 
future in the village despite the best efforts of state and federal programs. Blaming 
the Natives and their drinking and child-rearing habits provides a stunning 
rationale and counter-explanation for village disempowerment as the consistent 
result of state and federal policies. The argument that despite very obvious material 
changes in vilage life - new houses, utilities, schools and the like - that, as social 
centers, villages have become nonfunctioning communities has as a logical 
conclusion that Natives would be better off i f  encouraged to remove themselves to 
places like Anchorage, "the shining city by the shore, a haven of steady wages and 
bright lights," where their needs as Alaska citizens could be better served. 
If Natives did choose to leave for larger cities, the abandonment of villages as 
communities would render moot continuing assertions in the courts that villages are 
juridically Indian tribes with repositories of sovereign authority over people and 
land. Even i f  the state lost its lawsuits, the legal doctrine of federal Indian law does 
not require anyone to reinvent tribes that hae dissolved. Sovereign recognition is not 
a magic wand when waved over a corpse. 
But has not the Alaska experiment neatly avoided a collapse of the three-legged 
stool even i f  villages have been systematically disempowered through reallocation of 
power to nol).-tribal organizations and even i f  the social community dissolves? Have 
not the  1988 amendments secured the  s e t t l e m e n t  l a n d  b a s e  ( i f  
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undeveloped) and granted exclusive control to village people to determine when, i f  
ever, their stock will be sold? 
These new protections will survive so long as a majority in each village places 
the interests of the community over their individual needs. What i f  a majority 
migrates into the city, determining that they must address the needs of their children 
in a different way? The new claims formula shifts responsibility from the Congress to 
individuals who are impoverished (Conn, 1987:71). Its "freedom of choice" neatly pits 
Natives against themselves. If alienation of stock to non-Native buyers and loss of 
corporate control is a final betrayal, it will be Natives who betray themselves. 
And what of the village land base, untaxed i f  undeveloped, unpledged and 
unsubdivided? How long can village corporations resist development i f  shareholders 
demand jobs or dividends as a condition for disallowance of a sale of their stock? Even 
small scale development entirely appropriate to small village economies will raise 
the spectre of state taxation. 
Federal response to village needs in the Reagan era has included a distinct 
tendency to withdraw from the basic notion of support for tribal government 
(Morehouse, 1988:12-13). The Secretary of the Interior has refused to validate new 
tribal constitutions passed to his department. Congressional legislation has tended 
to define Alaska Natives not as tribal members, but as participants in the Settlement 
Act or by blood quantum (Conn, 1987:74-75). 
It is important to understand that this drift away from distinct tribal units and 
toward conceptualization of Arctic peoples as regional communities has been 
promoted by astute Native leaders. They recognized that access to the entirety of the 
land and sea base necessary to sustain subsistence required a shift of focus that 
ignored narrow community boundaries and pressed the federal government to 
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provide preferences and protections for an environment that ignores even national 
boundaries. Such was the vision of Eben Hopson, for example, who viewed Inupiat 
peoples as transnational (Hopson, 1976). 
Yet this tendency to engage the federal government on terms which befit the 
needs of a subsistence culture tended to understate the daily authority of smaller 
communties, even if their role was no more than that of staging areas for subsistence 
cultures. In the North Slope Borough legal and political power was withdrawn from 
the villages and centralized in the offices of the mayor (McBeath, 1981). 
Whether the Congress and Executive branches of the federal government will 
generate new policy that is directly supportive of village tribes should the courts 
finally determine that tribal governments exist is an imponderable. Yet, if the 1988 
amendments are a guide, it seems unlikely. 
So what then is the trap that has been laid by systematic avoidance of a tribal 
imperative in protection and support of Alaska Native peoples? It seems to be a 
combination of many factors. 
First, village survival was viewed by early leadership and later generations as 
dependent on economic survival of rural peoples through subsistence and 
participation in the larger Alaska resource economy as workers, shareholders and 
owners of a land base. Alaska youth were returned to the village to be educated in 
cultural terms and in Western terms. These goals were pursued through instruments 
of Native authority which were regional and statewide in authority and orientation. 
Second, Alaska interests and its economic destiny were viewed as coincidental 
with that of Native Alaskans. For a time, this was true. 
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Third, a shared administrative perspective dominated the thinking of all major 
players - federal, state and Native - a perspective that over time transformed village 
Alaskans into clients and recipients of benefits and services. This approach eroded 
local control either as a basis for decision making or as a tool for management of the 
necessities of daily village life. Villagers became an increasingly bothersome 
constituency of rural poor and not a source ofleadership. With each ratchet up the 
wheel of progress, village problems and needs outran the capacities of either state 
government or non-profit administrators to address them from distant places. 
Fourth, by the time that village frustration with lack of Native job opportunity 
and concern for protection of their lands had discovered a solution in revitalization of 
Native tribes, this solution had become a threat to Alaska's ultimate governance and 
management of its natural resources. For Native leadership, as well, the issue of 
tribal sovereignty which the state disputed had to be left out of any new 
Congressional reading of Native land and stock protections in order to secure Alaska 
support. 
Finally, what emerged was a new explanation for villages ((dying on the vine." 
At its core was the individual Native. If he chose to drink, to be a poor parent, to 
make his village unlivable or to flee to a city or regional center, this was his free 
choice. If his poverty or loss of connection to the village or regional corporation 
caused him to petition to make claims stock saleable this, also, was his free choice 
with no Congressional mandate. If he placed, or urged that the Native land base be 
placed at risk through pledges, subdivision or development, this also was his choice. 
Could tribes have protected Alaska Natives? Against whom would they be 
protecting their tribal members? Tribal authority may or may not have made 
villages more habitable. It most certainly would have robbed individual Natives of 
their right to make economic choices which influence so directly their future as 
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discrete Native peoples and robbed state and federal governments of a concealed 
influence on the destiny of Native peoples through their influence on purportedly free 
choices of Native individuals: where they choose to live and how they choose to 
survive. 
The message of the Alaska experiment for those who pursue strategies of 
change for other indigenous groups is that  however inefficient, duplicative, 
bureaucratic or even culturally compromised are small Native groups with power to 
influence their peers, the removal of this element in any formula for Native survival 
and self-determination leaves individuals with no real choice other than to disappear 
into the nether world of ethnic minorities. Tribes are, finally, buffers for which no 
program of reform can substitute because they are buffers against the hidden agenda 
of such programs. 
To deny the political dimension of small indigenous groups is to smooth the 
dying pillow. Such is the fate of Alaska Natives. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. There is an absolute dearth of analytical scholarship on this important period of
Alaska Native history. For example, the single biography of a Native leader
who played a critical role in the history of Alaska labor, Alaska state politics
and early Native politics is a children's book, William Beltz, The Story of A
Native American by former Alaska journalist Ellen Wolfe (1975). For this
reason, the author draws on newspaper articles and interviews with persons
familiar with the period, including veteran Alaska journalist Tom Snapp, who 
helped Howard Rock establish the Tundra Times and who covered the bush and
Native affairs for the Fairbanks News-Miner before purchasing the All-Alaska
Weekly. 
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